Military drones are becoming more diverse in type and use. They are used for a wide range of purposes, including reconnaissance, attack, and weapons delivery. In September 2019, Saudi Arabian oil facilities were attacked. The attack was carried out by the Yemeni Houthi militia using ten drones. The attack disrupted 5.7 million barrels per day, equivalent to approximately 60% of Saudi Arabia’s production, and caused a temporary surge in crude oil prices due to concerns about global supply. It also revealed that Saudi Arabia’s critical oil facilities, which support global energy security, are concentrated in a very small area in the east. Of course, Saudi Arabia was not without countermeasures. This wealthy country had advanced air defense systems from the United States, Germany, and France. However, this sophisticated air defense system was defeated by a low-tech, small drone. Furthermore, drones and their use continue to evolve.
When Russian drones invaded Poland in September 2025, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acted swiftly. Dutch fighter jets scrambled alongside Polish fighter jets and shot down the intruding drone, demonstrating NATO’s rapid response capabilities. Poland has announced that it will shoot down any aircraft violating its airspace. However, this successful downing does not come without challenges. That challenge is cost-effectiveness. A single fighter jet scramble costs approximately 8 million yen. For example, Ukrainian military FPVs are estimated to cost between 600 and 1,000 dollars (approximately 90,000 to 150,000 yen). Russian reconnaissance aircraft are likely similarly priced. Spending 8 million yen to shoot down a 100,000 yen drone places an excessive burden on the defense. The cost-effectiveness issue has reached a stage that countering drones can no longer be ignored. Countering inexpensive drones at high cost poses challenges. A key issue is whether a defense network can be established at low cost. The EU appears to be actively cooperating with the Ukrainian public and private sectors, which have expertise in anti-drone technology, regarding the “drone wall” concept.
At the same time, it has become clear that strengthening not only the shield but also the spear is necessary. The EU has begun considering securing medium- to long-term drone countermeasure capabilities and strengthening deterrence, including the ability to shoot down and retaliate. To dissuade Russia from launching new drones, improved deterrence is needed. Along with advanced warning systems, they are beginning to call for a balance of power that “deters with long-range European attack capabilities.” European efforts appear to be useful references for Asian countries and regions that are concerned about risks such as a Taiwan-related emergency.
